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Causal cognition in the physical domain has been treated for a long time as if it were (1)
objective and (2) independent of culture. Despite some evidence to the contrary, how-
ever, these implicit assumptions have been rarely ever explored systematically. While the
pervasive tendency of people to consider one of two equally important entities as more
important for bringing about an effect (as reported by White, 2006) meanwhile provides
one type of counter-evidence for the ﬁrst assumption, respective ﬁndings remained mute
to the second. In order to scrutinize how robust such tendencies are across cultures –
and, if not, on which aspects of culture they may depend – we asked German and Ton-
gan participants to assign prime causality in nine symmetric settings. For most settings,
strong asymmetries in both cultures were found, but not always in the same direction,
depending on the task content and by virtue of the multifaceted character of “culture.”
This indicates that causal asymmetries, while indeed being a robust phenomenon across
cultures, are also modulated by task-speciﬁc properties (such as ﬁgure–ground relations),
and are subject to cultural inﬂuences.
Keywords: causal cognition, culture, linguistic cues, agency,figure–grounddistinction,physical domain, asymmetry
bias
INTRODUCTION
Causality is one of the core concepts in our attempts to make
sense of the world, and the explanations we come up with shape
our judgments, emotions, and intentions. This renders causal cog-
nition a key topic for the social as well as the cognitive sciences.
However, despite an increasing awareness of the cultural constitu-
tion of cognition in various domains (e.g., Markus and Kitayama,
1991;Majid et al., 2004;Atran and Medin, 2008; Beller and Bender,
2008; Legare and Gelman, 2008; Bender et al., 2010a; Boroditsky
and Gaby, 2010; Bender and Beller, 2011a; Fausey and Borodit-
sky, 2011), little is known about the impact of culture on causal
cognition in the physical domain. While a plethora of insights
into general principles and processes of causal cognition have
been gathered (e.g., Talmy, 1988; Waldmann et al., 2006; Gopnik
and Schulz, 2007; Wolff, 2007), respective research is still largely
conﬁned to European and US samples (cf. Arnett, 2008). After
all, the physical world is the same for everybody and is open to
direct inspection; indeed, a thorough understanding of it is essen-
tial for survival. These considerations may have motivated the
assumption that perceiving physical causality should be largely
objective and independent of culture (e.g., Michotte, 1963; Sper-
ber et al., 1995; Spelke and Kinzler, 2007). However, unless we
empirically scrutinize this assumption, we may not consider it to
be valid (cf. Norenzayan and Heine, 2005; Atran and Medin, 2008;
Henrich et al., 2010). While it might be true that people intu-
itively grasp causal relationships, at least in simple settings, it is
an entirely different matter to assume that they understand and
represent it in the same – and physically adequate – way. And
in fact, a range of counter-arguments cast doubt on this latter
assumption.
HOW OBJECTIVE IS CAUSAL COGNITION?
The very premise that physical causal cognition is based on objec-
tive observation, is contradicted not only by popular misconcep-
tions, such as the impetus concept in motion (McCloskey, 1983;
Hubbard and Favretto, 2003) or the valve model of how a ther-
mostat functions (Kempton, 1986), but also by systematic biases.
For instance, people tend to assign causal roles (i.e., cause vs.
effect) even in strictly symmetric interactions. This effect has been
described by Peter White (2006), who considers it to be the ini-
tial stage of the two-stage causal asymmetry bias (in the second
stage, people tend to overestimate the impact of the cause object
and underestimate that of the effect object). Such an asymmetric
assignment of causal roles was experimentally demonstrated for a
variety of collision events (White, 2007): When a moving object
A hits a resting object B that then starts to move, the scene is
generally interpreted as a launching event caused by object A. An
alternative, yet still asymmetric reading could be that of a braking
event, in which object B stops the movement of object A. However,
for most people, this reading is neither obvious nor preferable.
The asymmetry bias is considered a general feature of causal
cognition, affecting most of what people perceive, believe, and lin-
guistically express with regard to causal relations (White, 2006).
In fact, the bias appears to be so pervasive that it even restricts
research questions and methods (White, 2006; Beller and Bender,
in preparation), thus raising the issue of how robust it is across
cultures.
HOW INVARIABLE IS CAUSAL COGNITION?
There are also reasonable challenges for the assumption that phys-
ical causal cognition is invariable across cultures. One piece of
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counter-evidence stems from research on causal attribution and
on attribution tendencies such as the “correspondence bias.” The
correspondence bias leads people to attribute observed behavior
to personal dispositions rather than situational factors. However,
this bias is much more pronounced among US Americans who
are reported as being more individualistic oriented than among
Chinese people who are reported as being more collectivistic
oriented (e.g., Morris and Peng, 1994; Norenzayan and Nisbett,
2000). Extending studies on such cross-cultural differences from
the social to the physical domain, Peng and Knowles (2003) found
respective differences between US-American and Chinese causal
attributions for three out of eight physical scenarios.
Although it remains somewhat controversial whether the corre-
spondence bias provides an unambiguous case of biasing (Malle,
1999) – and despite the fact that White (2006) dismisses it as a
social instance of the causal asymmetry bias – these ﬁndings indi-
cate at least that even in the physical domain, causal cognition
may be affected by culture. However, “culture” is not a homoge-
nous entity that could be located on a single dimension such as
individualistic vs. collectivistic orientation, but is rather composed
of innumerous aspects that may shift behavior into diverse direc-
tions (e.g., Atran and Medin, 2008; Beller et al., 2009a; Bender and
Beller, 2011b). To be sure, the cultural aspects relevant for causal
cognition do include social values and norms (which are partly
reﬂected in self-concept and social orientation), but they do also
encompass components such as culture-speciﬁc concepts and folk
theories or linguistic habits.
It ismeanwhile well established that people’s causal assessments
can be inﬂuenced by the information activated, for instance, by
linguistic cueing, by adding (irrelevant) covariation information,
or by substituting content elements in formally analogous tasks.
More speciﬁcally, the choice of particular verbs may affect peo-
ple’s decisions due to the implicit causality carried by the verb
(e.g., “A betrays B” invites more causal attribution for A, whereas
“A praises B” invites more causal attribution for B; cf. Majid et al.,
2007, and see Wolff et al., 2005). Similar effects can be obtained
by assigning the thematic roles of agent and patient differently
(Beller et al., 2009b). Also, providing covariation information –
for instance, by declaring one of two causes as given and the other
as added – leads people to assume that the latter has more causal
weight than the former (Cheng, 1997; Kuhnmünch and Beller,
2005; Beller and Bender, in preparation). Content, ﬁnally, has been
documented for decades to affect performance in reasoning tasks,
both by facilitating the valid conclusion when it converges with the
formal structure of the task, and by suppressing it when the two
diverge (Cummins, 1995; Beller and Kuhnmünch, 2007). These
latter ﬁndings also suggest that people habitually access back-
ground knowledge, which then modulates the reasoning process
(Beller and Spada, 2003; Klauer et al., 2010). As composition and
availability of such knowledge is culture-speciﬁc, it should give rise
to cultural differences in causal inferences (cf. Atran and Medin,
2008).
Crucially, there is no reason to assume that this multifaceted
cultural background of participants should give rise to one coher-
ent pattern of cultural differences in causal cognition. Rather, it is
more likely that these different factors may have distinct effects,
pointing into diverging directions.
DESIGN AND GOALS OF THE CURRENT STUDY
Despite this preliminary evidence to the contrary, hardly any of
the previous studies empirically tested the implicit assumptions of
objectivity and invariability. Addressing these issues was the inten-
tionof our cross-cultural screening study,which aimed at explicitly
assessing whether causal asymmetries are affected by culture and,
if so, which factors apart from a general attribution tendency –
notably linguistic cueing, covariation information, and content –
might modulate this effect.
In order to be able to detect an asymmetric role assignment,
a task is required in which two entities do interact symmetrically
to bring about an effect. Take, for instance, the ﬂoating task from
Beller et al. (2009b):
Is the fact that a piece of wood ﬂoats on water basically due
to . . .
(a) the piece of wood; (b) the water?
From a physical point of view, the ﬂoating depends on the ratio
of the densities of wood and water; the answer, therefore, must be
that the two entities are equally causative. In fact, the symmetry
of this static setting should be more easily discernible by layper-
sons than the symmetry of the dynamic collision events used by
White (2007), which strike people as asymmetric simply on tem-
poral grounds. An asymmetric role assignment (e.g., a preference
for the ﬂoater) with such static settings would therefore be an even
stronger ﬁnding than with dynamic events.
Previous cross-cultural studies typically focused on differences
pertaining to an individualistic vs. collectivistic orientation (or
features related to this distinction; cf. Peng et al., 2001). While a
large body of data indeed suggests that, on a general level, causal
assignments might be correlated with these orientations, the study
of Beller et al. (2009b) questions the exclusivity of this account:
With ﬂoating settings like the one presented above, the general
tendency to mark the ﬂoater (i.e., the “individual”) as being the
prime cause for the ﬂoating in a rather individualistic culture,
but the carrier (i.e., the supportive “medium”) in a more collec-
tivistic culture, could be shown to be strongly modulated both by
linguistic cues and task content. These ﬁndings suggest that the
general mechanism for causal assignments includes processes of
activating, selecting, and weighing up of different kinds of linguis-
tic information and individual knowledge. However, the previous
study was constrained to one type of setting (a ﬂoating setting),
one linguistic variation (transitive vs. intransitive phrasing), one
type of content variation (wood vs. oil as ﬂoater), and one type
of response format (forced-choice). This set-up does not allow for
broad generalizations, and it did only provide ﬁrst hints for, but no
conclusive interpretation of, the differences found. In this study,
we therefore intended to probe a wider range of factors beyond
general attribution tendencies and to explore their distinct effects.
As in Beller et al. (2009b), we compared participants from Ger-
many and Tonga, a Polynesian island kingdom in the Southwest
Paciﬁc. In this culture, Christianity is prevailing since the pros-
elytization in the nineteenth century, and scientiﬁc ﬁndings and
theories are conveyed during school education. Yet, some of the
traditional concepts pertaining to a dynamistic worldview still co-
exist with the introduced Western concepts (Bender, 2001; Bender
and Beller, 2003). In the social domain, on the other hand, the
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social structure and fundamental cultural values remained largely
unaffected. They are based on relative rank, a pronounced group
orientation, and an emphasis on mutual support which, in turn,
generate strong social cohesion and a large degree of heteronomy
(Marcus, 1978; Morton, 1996; Evans, 2001; Bender et al., 2007).
This pervasive inﬂuence of one’s social environment on one’s deci-
sions and behavior adds not only to the external causes of behavior,
but most likely also fosters an awareness of these external causes,
thereby supporting situational attributions.
In line with this characterization, the Tongan culture differs
from the German one on a wide range of dimensions, three of
which are of particular interest here. First, whereas individualistic
values are emphasized together with a rather independent self-
concept in Germany, collectivistic values are emphasized together
with a rather interdependent self-concept in Tonga (Bender et al.,
2007; Beller et al., 2009a). This renders the two cultures apt candi-
dates for a comparison in the classical individualism/collectivism
paradigm as they reﬂect the usual differences in social orientation,
while at the same time providing a valuable extension to the pre-
ponderant American/Asian contrast. In addition, due to partial
differences in folk-physical convictions, distinct effects of content
may be expected. And ﬁnally, the two languages differ with regard
to how they categorize agents and patients in causative construc-
tions. German as a nominative–accusative language treats subjects
of transitive and intransitive sentences alike (with the nomina-
tive case), while setting them apart from the objects of transitive
sentences (in the accusative). Tongan as an ergative–absolutive lan-
guage, on the other hand, treats subjects of intransitive sentences
and objects of transitive sentences alike (with the absolute case),
while subjects of transitive sentences are set apart by the ergative
case (Chung, 1978; Duranti, 1994; Bender and Beller, 2003; and
see Figure 1).
According to the individualism/collectivism paradigm (Peng
and Knowles, 2003), one would expect causal asymmetries to be
more pronounced in Germany than in Tonga as the collectivistic
cultural orientation in Tonga should lead to a more balanced con-
sideration of both entities. However, this general tendency might
be modulated by other factors relevant for assessing causality.
One candidate factor is the linguistic marking of agency (cf.
Beller et al., 2009b). Agency can be linguistically assigned to either
entity in question by different means, for example, by using par-
ticular causal verbs, grammatical roles, active vs. passive voice (in
German), or ergative vs. non-ergative constructions (in Tongan).
If agency is a relevant linguistic cue for making causal role assign-
ments then the linguistically marked agent should be preferred as
prime cause. In the ﬂoating setting above, this would be the wood.
Another candidate for modulating the perception of causality
is the ﬁgure–ground distinction. Suppose that in the setting above,
ﬂoating resulted from pouring water into a bowl that contained
a piece of wood. As the water is added to the scene, it might be
considered the ﬁgure, while the wood, being there from the very
beginning,provides the background. If being aﬁgure is relevant for
making causal role assignments then the water should be preferred
as prime cause.
A second possibility for marking one entity as the ﬁgure is by
adding covariation information (Cheng, 1997; Kuhnmünch and
epytegaugnaL
Nominative-accusative Ergative-absolutive 
intransitive Subject SubjectVerb
type
transitive Subject Object Subject Object
Grammatical case Nominative Accusative Ergative Absolutive
selpmaxE
intransitive Das Holz schwimmt. ‘Oku tētē (‘a) e papa.  [PRS float (ABS) ART wood]
transitive
(active)
Das Wasser trägt das Holz.
[lit.: The water supports the wood]Verb
type
transitive
(passive)
Das Holz wird
vom Wasser getragen.
[lit.: The wood  is-being  
by-the water supported]
‘Oku poupou’i (‘a) e papa  
‘e he vai. 
[PRS support (ABS) ART wood
ERG ART water]
Abbreviations: ABS = absolutive marker, ART = article, ERG = ergative marker, PRS = marker for 
present time; hyphenated word-pairs in English transcript indicate that only one word is required in 
German; markers in brackets are omitted in spoken language.  
Note: The word order for absolutive and ergative is flexible in Tongan. 
[lit.: The wood swims/floats]
FIGURE 1 | Categorization of subject and object in nominative–accusative languages and ergative–absolutive languages, with examples from
German andTongan.
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Beller, 2005; Beller and Bender, in preparation). If you receive the
information that a piece of coal goes down in water whereas the
piece of wood ﬂoats on water, you might consider the water as con-
stant background and attribute the ﬂoating to the covarying entity
wood (the ﬁgure) – although the ﬂoating of wood on water is com-
pletely independent of whether or not coal is ﬂoating. Changing
the ﬁgure–ground mapping might thus be a powerful means for
inducing a shift in causal role assignments.
Finally, the causal assignments might also depend on speciﬁc
content concepts that people associate with the content of the
task, giving rise to content effects (cf. Beller and Kuhnmünch, 2007;
Beller et al., 2009b). As a priori assumptions are difﬁcult to make
with regard to which content elements induce which effect, we
probed different kinds of elements: different physical relations
(e.g., ﬂoating, rising vs. staying down, repelling vs. attracting)
with different kinds of entities (e.g., freshwater ﬂoating on salt-
water, wood ﬂoating on water, and cornﬂakes ﬂoating on milk).
Therefore, this part of variation is rather explorative in nature.
However, based on the cultural characteristics of Tonga as com-
pared to Germany, two speciﬁc hypotheses may be ventured. Both
are derived from the large degree of heteronomy and the pro-
nounced emphasis on (social) support in Tonga. This awareness
for the external causes of behavior in the social domain may be
extended to other domains, thus nourishing a tendency to ascribe
generally more responsibility to the carrier than to the ﬂoater in
the ﬂoating setting (cf. Beller et al., 2009a,b).We therefore assumed
that, ﬁrst, causal assignments in Tonga may stick with the carrier
even under altered conditions. To test this, we added a setting in
which freshwater (which had been the carrier previously) now ﬁg-
ured as the ﬂoater, being supported by saltwater. If, as we expected
for our German participants, freshwater serves as the basic ref-
erence point, the causal assignment of our Tongan participants
should switch from the carrier to the ﬂoater. If, however, the sup-
port aspect is more salient for them, causal assignment should still
favor the carrier. And second,we assumed that asymmetric assign-
ments among Tongans should be less pronounced for settings in
which no single entity can be regarded as supporting the other.
To test this, we added settings with even more symmetric relation,
namely mutual attraction and dispersion.
EXPERIMENT
Nine physical settings were used in this study, six of which are con-
cerned with buoyancy in different ways, two with dispersion, and
one with gravitational attraction. Each setting mentions two enti-
ties that are equally involved for bringing about an effect. Thus,
from a physical point of view, all settings are entirely symmetric,
which is necessary in order to pin point asymmetric preferences
in causal role assignments. In all tasks, people had to decide which
of the two entities is responsible for bringing about the speciﬁc
outcome.
METHOD
Materials
Nine physical settings were constructed according to the sentence
frame that was used in the introductory ﬂoating task: “The fact
that wood {entity 1} ﬂoats on {physical relation} water {entity 2}
is basically due to . . . the wood {entity 1} . . . the water {entity
2}.” For each setting, different task versions were prepared by
varying either agency, or the ﬁgure–ground mapping, or the con-
tent.Anoverviewof the settings andof the experimental variations
is given in Table 1 together with one example item from each
setting.
Three settings are concerned with buoyancy in static ﬂoating
events. In setting (A), we introduced a causative to shift agency
from the ﬂoater (“freshwater ﬂoats on saltwater”) to the carrier
(“saltwater lets freshwater ﬂoat”). In setting (B), we used a dif-
ferent verb to mark the carrier as agentive (“wood is supported
by water”) as compared to the ﬂoater (“wood ﬂoats on water”).
This substitution of verbs coincided with a shift in voice (passive
vs. active) in German and a shift from an ergative construction to
a non-ergative construction in Tongan. In setting (C), we varied
which entity is marked as ﬁgure: either the ﬂoater (“Cornﬂakes are
placed in a bowl containing milk. The fact that . . .”), or the carrier
(“Milk is placed in a bowl containing cornﬂakes. The fact that . . .”)
or none (“There are cornﬂakes and milk [milk and cornﬂakes] in
a bowl. The fact that . . .”).
Three settings are concerned with buoyancy in dynamic events.
In setting (D), we probed the content of the entities by comparing
concrete entities (“CO2 rises in water”) with abstract entities (“a
gas rises in a substance”). In setting (E), the same type of content
manipulation was combined with a different verb: “staying down”
in a concrete version (“CO2 stays down in air”) and in an abstract
version (“a gas stays down in a substance”). For setting (F), we re-
used the formulations of setting (E), both concrete and abstract,
and added covariation information in order to mark as the ﬁgure
of the scene either the gases (e.g., in the concrete version: “Helium
rises in air. The fact that CO2 stays down in air . . .”) or themedium
(e.g.,“CO2 rises in water. The fact that CO2 stays down in air . . .”).
The last three settings are concerned with mutual attraction.
Two dispersion events probed agency by varying the thematic role:
In setting (G), the verb “to mix”was used, focusing either on vine-
gar as agentive (“vinegar does not mix with oil”), or on oil (“oil
does not mix with vinegar”), or on both in a linguistically sym-
metric way (“vinegar and oil [oil and vinegar] do not mix with
each other”). In setting (H), the verb “to repel” was used in the
same way, focusing either on water as agentive (“water repels fat”),
or on the fat (“fat repels water”), or symmetrically on both (“water
and fat [fat and water] repel each other”). Finally, in setting (I) on
gravitational attraction, the content of the entities was varied by
comparing an abstract description with explicit size information
(“a large and a small [a small and a large] celestial body attract each
other”) to concrete entities with implicit size information (“earth
and moon [moon and earth] attract each other”).
For each setting, participants were required to decide which
of the two entities mentioned is responsible for bringing about
the speciﬁc outcome. As the Tongan school system is based on
a British curriculum, it can be assumed, that both Germans and
Tongans have comparable formal knowledge of how the physical
entities referred to in our settings relate to each other. Frequently,
however, such formal knowledge only partly overwrites naïve,
folk-physical convictions (e.g., McCloskey, 1983; Hubbard and
Favretto, 2003). To outmaneuver possible effects of school educa-
tion and tap into deeper, folk-theoretical convictions, participants
were requested to decide between the two entities (in all settings
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Table 1 |The nine physical settings, the experimental variation under scrutiny, and one example item.
Setting Variation Example item
B
uo
ya
nc
y,
st
at
ic
(A) Freshwater ﬂoating on
saltwater
Agency:
ﬂoater vs. carrier
The fact that freshwater ﬂoats on saltwater is basically
due to . . .  the freshwater/ the saltwater?
[agency: ﬂoater]
(B) Wood ﬂoating on water Agency:
ﬂoater vs. carrier
The fact that wood is supported by water is basically
due to . . . the water |———————| the wood?
[agency: carrier]
(C) Cornﬂakes ﬂoating on milk Figure: cornﬂakes vs.
milk vs. none
Cornﬂakes are placed in a bowl containingmilk.The fact that the cornﬂakes
ﬂoat on the milk is basically due to . . .  the cornﬂakes/ the milk?
[ﬁgure: cornﬂakes]
B
uo
ya
nc
y,
dy
na
m
ic
(D) –Gas rising in a substance Content:
abstract vs. concrete
The fact that a gas rises in a substance is basically due
to . . .  the substance/ the gas?
[content: abstract]
–CO2 rising in water
(E) –Gas staying down in a
substance
Content:
abstract vs. concrete
The fact that CO2 stays down in air is basically due to
. . .  the CO2/ the air?
[content: concrete]
–CO2 staying down in air
(F) –Gas staying down in a
substance
Figure:
gases vs. substances
CO2 rises in water. The fact that CO2 stays down in air
is basically due to . . .  the CO2/ the air?
[ﬁgure: substances]
–CO2 staying down in air Content:
abstract. vs. concrete
M
ut
ua
la
tt
ra
ct
io
n (G) Vinegar and oil, not mixing Agency:
vinegar vs. oil vs. both
The fact that vinegar does not mix with oil is basically
due to . . .  the oil/ the vinegar?
[agency: vinegar]
(H) Water and fat, repelling Agency:
water vs. fat vs. both
The fact that water and fat repel each other is basically
due to . . .  the water/ the fat?
[agency: both]
(I) –Celestial bodies attracting
each other
Content:
abstract vs. concrete
The fact that earth and moon attract each other is
basically due to . . .  the moon/ the earth?
[content: concrete]
–Earth and moon attracting
each other
but setting B). If participants hold no such convictions (or if their
convictions are compatible with the physical explanation), forced-
choices should trigger a random response pattern ceteris paribus,
and thus result in a pattern that is balanced for both options.
If one option is favored, an asymmetric pattern emerges, which
may result from culture-speciﬁc concepts activated during pro-
cessing, or from culture-speciﬁc patterns in the processing itself.
To be able to assess whether the forced-choice format skews peo-
ple’s responses in an unintended way, setting (B) employed an
analog rating scale (of 10 cm length) that allowed relative causal
effectiveness to be allocated.
All materials were presented in the participants’ native lan-
guage (they had been translated by bilinguals and double checked
in repeated re-translation sequences).
Participants
The German sample consisted of 93 students (36 male, 56 female)
from the University of Freiburg with different ﬁelds of study (yet,
excluding physics) and mean age 23.7 years (SD= 5.19). The Ton-
gan sample consisted of 103 students (43 male, 56 female) from
the Ha’apai High-School with mean age 16.9 years (SD= 2.40).
Despite the difference in age, the participants are roughly com-
parable in terms of education level: The Tongan students attended
a competitive high-school with Cambridge International Exami-
nations Curriculum and were shortly before their ﬁnal exams that
qualify for university entry; most German students were shortly
after these exams (please note that, until recently, German stu-
dents were generally older than most others when taking these
exams). These differences in age and education will be picked
up in the discussion. Importantly, the Tongan students do not
differ substantially from their Tongan age mates in terms of cul-
tural immersion, at least not regarding social values, norms, and
relationships (despite their access to advanced formal education).
Design and procedure
The tasks were administered in a mixed design with the nine set-
tings presented within-subjects and the variations of each setting
between-subjects. The order of the settings was randomized, with
the following exceptions: Setting (B) was always presented last,
because its analog scale offered more leeway for assigning causal-
ity. Setting (F) was never presented before (E), as (E) provided
the baseline for the covariation conditions in (F). Also (A) and
(C) were not presented in a row due to their related content, and
the same applied for (D) and (E), and for (G) and (H). In the
linguistically symmetric versions, the two entities were presented
in balanced order, as were the two answer options in each task
across the conditions. Participants were randomly assigned to the
conditions.
RESULTS
All settings are symmetric from a physical perspective, and in some
versions of settings (G) to (I) we even emphasized this by linguisti-
cally assigning agency to both entities. If not affected by assignment
biases, people should solve all tasks in the same way, namely with a
50:50 distribution. Members of both cultures should solve all tasks
in a similar way if they are not affected by culture-speciﬁc concepts
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or linguistic cues. The data of each setting were ﬁrst checked for
differences between cultures and for effects of the experimental
variations (by means of log-linear analyses, if not indicated oth-
erwise), and then analyzed for asymmetries in causal roles. An
overview of the results is presented in Figure 2.
Buoyancy, static events
The three settings concerned with buoyancy in static events indi-
cated cross-cultural similarities and differences, depending on
the content of the setting, and ﬁgure–ground effects, but no
effects of agency. Setting (A) with freshwater ﬂoating on saltwater
revealed neither a difference between countries (G2 = 0.75; df = 1;
N = 193; p = 0.385), nor an effect of agency (G2 = 2.77; df = 1;
p = 0.096), nor an interaction (G2 = 0.27; df = 1; p = 0.605).
Aggregated across both agency versions, clear asymmetries were
detected: The German participants preferred the carrier as
causative for the ﬂoating (73.9% saltwater ; χ2 = 21.04; df = 1;
N = 92; p < 0.001), and so did the Tongans (79.2% saltwater ;
χ2 = 34.47; df = 1; N = 101; p < 0.001).
In setting (B) with wood ﬂoating on water, an analy-
sis of variance revealed a clear difference between countries
[F(1,95)= 20.40; p < 0.001], but again no effect of agency
[F(1,95)= 1.63; p = 0.205] and no interaction [F(1,95)= 0.07;
p = 0.797]. Again, causal asymmetries were detected, but this
time they point in different directions: Aggregated across both
agency versions, the German participants preferred the ﬂoater
as causative (69.6% wood ; t = 5.96; df = 46; p < 0.001), whereas
the Tongan participants again preferred the carrier (62.8% water ;
FIGURE 2 | Assignment of causality in the nine physical settings in Germany (white circles) andTonga (black diamonds).
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t =−2.11; df = 51; p = 0.040). The overall data pattern from this
task replicates previous ﬁndingswith this task despite two substan-
tial changes of sampling and material (German university students
and a rating format in this study vs. German high-school students
and a forced-choice format in Beller et al., 2009b).
Finally, setting (C) with cornﬂakes ﬂoating on milk revealed
differences between countries (G2 = 28.23; df = 1; N = 194;
p < 0.001) and an effect of the ﬁgure–ground manipulation
(G2 = 7.46;df = 2;p = 0.024),but againno interaction (G2 = 0.85;
df = 2; p = 0.653). In the baseline condition (ﬁgure= none), Ger-
man participants preferred the ﬂoater as causative (84.8% corn-
ﬂakes; χ2 = 22.26; df = 1; N = 46; p < 0.001), whereas the Ton-
gan participants revealed no clear preference (49.0% cornﬂakes;
χ2 = 0.02; df = 1; N = 51; p = 0.889). The preferences remained
unchanged if the ﬂoater (cornﬂakes) was marked as the ﬁgure, but
changed toward the carrier (milk) in both countries alike if the
carrier was marked as the ﬁgure.
Comparing the three ﬂoating settings (A), (B), and (C), the
data also indicate a clear content effect: In Germany, the preference
shifts from the carrier as causative in setting (A) with freshwater
ﬂoating on saltwater to the ﬂoater as causative in (B) and (C) with
solid objects ﬂoating on a liquid; in Tonga, the supporting entities
generally attracted more attention than in Germany.
Buoyancy, dynamic events
The three settings concerned with buoyancy in dynamic events
indicated cross-cultural differences depending on the content and
the ﬁgure of the setting in two of three cases. Setting (D) with gas
rising in a substance indicated neither a difference between coun-
tries (G2 = 1.52; df = 1; N = 97; p = 0.218), nor an effect of con-
tent (G2 = 2.72;df = 1; p = 0.099),nor an interaction (G2 = 0.002;
df = 1; p = 0.964). Aggregated across both content versions, an
asymmetrywasdetected inGermany (68.8% gas;χ2 = 6.75;df = 1;
N = 48; p = 0.009), but not in Tonga (53.1% gas; χ2 = 0.184;
df = 1; N = 49; p = 0.668).
Setting (E) with gas staying down in a substance did neither
indicate a difference between countries (G2 = 1.64; df = 1;N = 97;
p = 0.200), nor an effect of content (G2 = 0.04; df = 1; p = 0.840),
but an interaction (G2 = 5.28; df = 1; p = 0.022). Participants gave
quite balanced answers in the abstract task (43.5% gas in Ger-
many and 54.2% gas in Tonga), but differed in the concrete task
with a preference for the gas as causative in Germany (66.7% gas;
χ2 = 2.33;df = 1;N = 21; p = 0.127) and for themedium inTonga
(69.0% medium; χ2 = 4.17; df = 1; N = 29; p = 0.041).
Setting (F) supplemented the contents from setting (E) with
covariation information. As the content variation in (F) did not
make much of a difference, the data were pooled across con-
crete and abstract tasks. The analysis did not indicate differences
between countries (G2 = 0.02; df = 1; N = 194; p = 0.887), but
an effect of the ﬁgure–ground manipulation (G2 = 5.88; df = 1;
p = 0.015), and an interaction (G2 = 9.07; df = 1; p = 0.003).
Tongan participants gave quite balanced answers irrespective of
the covariation condition (54.0 vs. 56.9% gas; χ2 = 0.08; df = 1;
N = 101; p = 0.772). German participants preferred the gas as
causative when the covariation pointed to the gases as ﬁgure,
and the other substances (the medium) when the covariation
pointed to the medium as ﬁgure (75.5 vs. 36.4% gas; χ2 = 14.49;
df = 1; N = 93; p < 0.001). As, from a physical point of view, the
covariation information is irrelevant for the solution of this task,
this latter ﬁnding is an instance of the distracting effect of covari-
ation information that we found in Germany with other physical
settings as well (Beller and Bender, in preparation).
Mutual attraction
The three settings concerned with mutual attraction indicated
cross-cultural similarities in the assignment of causality and con-
tent effects, but again no effects of agency. Setting (G) with
vinegar and oil not mixing with each other revealed differences
between countries (G2 = 10.28; df = 1; N = 195; p = 0.001), but
no effect of agency (G2 = 0.53; df = 2; p = 0.769) and no inter-
action (G2 = 0.57; df = 2; p = 0.751). Aggregated across all three
agency versions, clear asymmetries were detected: The German
participants preferred oil as causative (86.0% oil ; χ2 = 48.27;
df = 1; N = 93; p < 0.001), and so did the Tongan participants,
albeit to a lesser degree (66.7% oil ; χ2 = 11.33; df = 1; N = 102;
p = 0.001).
Nearly the same result was found in the second dispersion set-
ting (H) with water and fat repelling each other: The analysis indi-
cated differences between countries (G2 = 4.14; df = 1; N = 194;
p = 0.042), but again no effect of agency (G2 = 0.13; df = 2;
p = 0.939), and no interaction (G2 = 0.52; df = 2; p = 0.773).
Aggregated across the three agency versions, similar asymmetries
as in setting (G) were detected: The German participants pre-
ferred the fat as causative (80.4% fat ; χ2 = 34.09; df = 1; N = 92;
p < 0.001), and so did the Tongan participants, albeit to a lesser
degree (67.6% fat ; χ2 = 12.71; df = 1; N = 102; p < 0.001).
Finally, setting (I) concerning gravitational attraction between
celestial bodies revealed differences between countries (G2 = 6.35;
df = 1; N = 117; p = 0.012) and an effect of content (G2 = 18.86;
df = 1; p < 0.001), but no interaction (G2 = 2.28; df = 1;
p = 0.131). In the abstract task, the larger celestial body was pre-
ferred as causative in Germany (100.0% large; p < 0.001 according
to the binomial distribution with r = 1/2 and N = 31) as well as
in Tonga (87.5 large;χ2 = 13.50; df = 1; N = 24; p < 0.001). In the
concrete task, the larger body (the earth as compared to the moon)
was still preferred in Germany (74.2% large; χ2 = 7.26; df = 1;
N = 31; p = 0.007), but not in Tonga (51.6% large; χ2 = 0.03;
df = 1; N = 31; p = 0.857).
General patterns
Summarizing the data, four general ﬁndings emerge: First, causal
asymmetries were found in both cultures (in eight of the nine set-
tings in Germany and in six settings in Tonga), but they varied
across tasks and cultures. In four settings (A, G, H, and I), the
biases were alike, in one setting (B) they diverged, and in four
settings (C, D, E, and F), a bias was detected in one culture only.
With two exceptions (A and E), the asymmetry was generally less
pronounced in Tonga, as was expected due to the general cul-
tural orientation, which is more collectivistic in Tonga than in
Germany. Second, the linguistic variations of agency (employed in
settingsA,B,G, andH) hadno effect on participants’ causal assign-
ments – contrary to what we expected. Third, whichever object
was focused on as the ﬁgure of the setting was given the stronger
weight, as predicted (C and F inGermany, andC in Tonga). Finally,
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the asymmetries were modulated by the task content : Its strength
and direction varied across physical relations (cf. rising in D and
staying down in E) and also across the entities involved (e.g., in
the three ﬂoating settings A, B, and C). Abstracting from concrete
entities had diverging effects: The abstract versions were less prone
to asymmetric assignments in the buoyancy tasks (D and E),where
abstraction highlights the (symmetric) physical relation, but more
so in the attraction task (I), where the abstraction co-occurs with
an explication of the size of the entities.
Compared to theGermanparticipants,ourTonganparticipants
seem to be generally less susceptible to assignment biases, at least
on the group level. But does this also hold on the individual level?
To answer this question,we analyzed the distributions of the rating
data pooled for the two agency conditions (see Figure 3). While in
Germany, the mean asymmetry toward the ﬂoater is reﬂected in
the distribution of the individual ratings, which is skewed to the
right (skewness =−0.817; SE= 0.347), the more balanced mean
rating in Tonga is not at all reﬂected in the distribution (skew-
ness = 0.576; SE= 0.330). Rather, the Tongan pattern is marked by
two clear peaks – a stronger one on the carrier and a weaker one on
the ﬂoater – while barely anybody gave a balanced rating. A sym-
metric pattern on the group level in the forced-choice format does
therefore not speak against an assignment bias among individuals.
This also implies that this format provides a rather conservative
test for asymmetries, which are only attested if people consistently
exhibit the same preference. Importantly, this data pattern also
speaks against a simple explanation in terms of an individual-
istic vs. collectivistic orientation: The individualism/collectivism
paradigm predicts that members of a culture with a strong collec-
tivistic orientation should consider circumstances more strongly
and thus assign causality in a more balanced manner than mem-
bers of an individualistic culture. As seen above, on the group level
this was indeed observed for Tonga and Germany. On the indi-
vidual level, however, Tongans tended to assign causality in a less
balanced manner than Germans.
DISCUSSION
Our ﬁndings provide cross-cultural evidence for asymmetric
causal role assignments in physically symmetric settings and
thereby go beyond previous research in three respects: First, while
concurring with White’s ﬁndings of a pervasive causal asymmetry
FIGURE 3 | Distribution of the causal assignments in setting B with the
analog rating format (in decentiles), pooled across the two agency
conditions.
bias in physical settings, they demonstrate assignment preferences
even for static settings that are discernibly more symmetric than
the original launching setting used by White (2007). However, we
hesitate to interpret our ﬁndings as evidence for the causal asym-
metry bias in the narrower sense, as we tested only one of the
two stages White (2006) considers prerequisite: We did identify
which factor people perceive as causative, but we did not separately
assess its assumed importance. However, at least on the aggregated
level, assigning causal roles results in asymmetric patterns (even
for unquestionably symmetric relations) that betray an underlying
bias. Second, our ﬁndings document such assignment preferences
in two very different cultures. This does not prove, in a strict sense,
that this phenomenon is universal, but it is a ﬁrst piece of evidence
in this direction (Norenzayan and Heine, 2005). And third, they
show that the strength and occasionally even the direction of the
asymmetry can be modulated in various ways, thus resulting in
culture-speciﬁc and task-speciﬁc preferences.
While these ﬁndings concur, in general,with Peng and Knowles’
(2003) conclusion that culture affects causal cognition, it goes
beyond the classic focus on “East–West” differences in general
attribution tendencies in two ways. First, they reveal that compat-
ibility of causal assignments with general attribution tendencies
on the group level need not be reﬂected on the individual level.
And second, our study identiﬁed two additional factors for peo-
ple’s assignments: ﬁgure–groundmapping and task content.While
ﬁgure–ground mapping should (and did) have similar effects in
both cultures, a priori assumptions with regard to how culture-
speciﬁc concepts will affect causal assignments are not easily put
forward. However, the ﬁndings of the static ﬂoating settings (A,
B, and C) are in line with our (preliminary) hypothesis that the
strong Tongan focus on cooperation and support might extend
to the physical domain: In Tonga, supporting entities did attract
more attention – saltwater in (A), water in (B), and milk in (C).
In Germany, on the other hand (fresh-)water and other drinkable
liquids seem to provide the background against which other sub-
stances – saltwater in setting (A), wood in (B), and cornﬂakes in
(C) – are then considered speciﬁc and hence causative. Far from
conﬁrming the previously widespread assumption that apprais-
ing physical causality should be objective and largely independent
of culture, our data thus attest to a profound susceptibility of
causal cognition to a range of factors, even in simple physical
settings.
Three reservations have to be made, though, with regard to the
generality of our results. First, the cultural differences we found
crucially depend on how comparable our samples were. As stated
in the Section “Participants,” we believe their educational back-
ground to be not too different, while mean age clearly is. One
of the settings allows us to assess, to some extent, whether this
difference may have had substantial effects: Setting (B) “wood
ﬂoats on water” was also used in a related study (Beller et al.,
2009b) with German and Tongan high-school students not only
of the same educational background but also of the same age,
and this study obtained nearly identical results, namely a prefer-
ence for the carrier in Tonga and for the ﬂoater in Germany. This
replication with different samples encourages us to interpret the
differences obtained in the current study as indeed arising from
culture-speciﬁc factors. Additional support for this interpretation
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stems from the fact that differences between Tongan and German
participants were not constant across tasks. Response patterns
differed in some settings only, while in others they resembled
each other (e.g., in settings A, G, and H), thus suggesting content-
speciﬁc interpretations of each task. Moreover, the forced-choice
options are not compatible with whatever our participants may
have learned during formal education, neither in Germany nor
in Tonga. This was explicitly intended to tap deeper folk-physical
intuitions (which can be assumed to be only partly overwritten
by school knowledge). And indeed, even where it was possible to
indicate the physically correct solution on the analog rating scale,
only a few participants chose to do so. We hold, therefore, that the
observed occurrence of a strong assignment bias in this regardmay
be interpreted as reﬂecting underlying folk-physical convictions.
Nevertheless – and beyond the question of sample comparability
– it would be highly desirable to replicate our screening study with
more diverse samples in both cultures.
The second reservation concerns our usage of the forced-choice
format. This was considered legitimate for the purpose of this
study as it prevented participants from simply activating the for-
mal knowledge acquired in school. As we controlled for all factors
that might shift participants’ attention (such as the order in which
the response options occurred or the order in which entities in
symmetric settingswerementioned),we can exclude that the accu-
mulation of answers was an artifact. Rather, it can be interpreted
as reﬂecting some prevailing tendency. In support of this argu-
ment, a comparison of two identical tasks on the same content
– one with forced-choice (Beller et al., 2009b) and one with rat-
ing scale (this study, setting B) – yielded no signiﬁcant differences
in response patterns of German or Tongan participants. How-
ever, given that task content partly modulated people’s responses,
it is difﬁcult to generalize from just one task to the whole set.
Furthermore, being able to assess more faithfully the actual con-
victions and conceptual models of participants would be highly
desirable for future studies. One option to achieve this could be
to ask participants for explanations. This would also help to tackle
the important question of which of the two potentially compet-
ing concepts (i.e., the scientiﬁc ones learned in formal education
and the folk-theoretical ones) is actually more relevant for how
people understand the world and respond to it (cf. Legare and
Gelman, 2008; Legare et al., in press). So far, we could show that
our participants do access folk-theoretical concepts under certain
circumstances, but we cannot infer in which real-world contexts
they indeed prefer those concepts.
And ﬁnally, other than in the previous study (Beller et al.,
2009b), the different versions of cueing agency adopted in this
survey yielded no signiﬁcant effect. In particular, the intended
shift in focus enclosed in the variation of “A ﬂoats on B” vs. “B lets
A ﬂoat” did not affect the response pattern in either language. The
same holds for the variation of “is ﬂoating” vs. “is supported by.”
However, as these two sets of formulations do not cover the whole
range of possible formulations, this does not preclude that lin-
guistic cueing may have effects more generally. The (linguistically
induced) ﬁgure/ground reversal provides a case in point, where
such manipulations were indeed effective. Clearly, more in-depth
analyses and a broader range of linguistic variants are required
here to settle this question.
Our ﬁndings have important implications. Asymmetric assign-
ment of causal roles leads people to perceive, understand, and
describe interactions not as symmetric relations, but as “rela-
tions between doer and done-to” (White, 2006). Once people have
decided which entity they regard as causative, they tend to over-
estimate its importance. Yet, focusing on single factors as critical
may impair problem solving, for instance with regard to technical
malfunctioning, ecosystem management, or social conﬂicts; and
even in simple physical settings, it will at least impede learning
and understanding. Analyzing the consequences of such assign-
ment biases for the causal reasoning processes of both laypersons
and scientists thus remains a crucial task for the future.
In doing so it also needs to be kept in mind that “culture” is not
simply a homogenous entity that may lead in just one direction.
Instead, people’s cultural background is composed of innumer-
ous different components. Owing to this multifaceted character,
its impact on causal cognition may give rise to heterogeneous
patterns. As we have seen in this study, asymmetric assignments
are triggered not by one single rationale, but by a host of differ-
ent aspects (e.g., the physical relation under scrutiny, the concrete
entities involved, the ﬁgure–ground distinction, etc.). The general
mechanism involves processes of activating, selecting, and weigh-
ing up relevant information – but we have only just begun to
explore this conglomeration. More research is required to identify
the speciﬁc concepts uponwhichpeople base their assessments and
to explore the ways in which they acquire them. Finding cultural
differences therefore cannot be the end of the endeavor, but need
to be understood as starting point (Bender et al., 2010b; Bender
and Beller, 2011b). If we are striving to achieve a comprehensive
picture of human cognition, it is indispensable to take its cultural
constitution into account.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank the government of Tonga for granting us research per-
mission,andwe are grateful toChristophKlauer,TokaPuleiku,and
Moana Faka’osi for support with data collection, and to Susanne
Bubser, Sione Faka’osi, Sarah Mannion de Hernandez, and the two
reviewers for valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper.
The article processing charges are covered by the Publication Fund
of the Library of Freiburg University, supported by a grant of the
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft DFG.
REFERENCES
Arnett, J. J. (2008). The neglected 95%:
why American psychology needs to
become less American. Am. Psychol.
63, 602–614.
Atran, S., and Medin, D. L. (2008).
The Native Mind and the Cultural
Construction of Nature. Boston: MIT
Press.
Beller, S., and Bender, A. (2008). The
limits of counting: numerical
cognition between evolu-
tion and culture. Science 319,
213–215.
Beller, S., Bender, A., and Song, J.
(2009a). Conditional promises and
threats in Germany, China, and
Tonga: cognition and emotion. J.
Cogn. Cult. 9, 115–139.
Beller, S., Bender, A., and Song,
J. (2009b). Weighing up physical
causes: effects of culture, linguistic
cues, and content. J. Cogn. Cult. 9,
347–365.
Beller, S., and Kuhnmünch, G.
(2007). What causal con-
ditional reasoning tells us
about people’s understanding
www.frontiersin.org September 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 231 | 9
Bender and Beller Causal asymmetry across cultures
of causality. Think. Reas. 13,
426–460.
Beller, S., and Spada, H. (2003).
The logic of content effects in
propositional reasoning: the case
of “conditional reasoning with a
point of view.” Think. Reas. 9,
335–378.
Bender, A. (2001). “God will send us
the ﬁsh”: perception and evaluation
of an environmental risk in Ha’apai,
Tonga. Res. Soc. Probl. Public Policy
9, 165–190.
Bender, A., and Beller, S. (2003).
“Polynesian tapu in the ‘deon-
tic square’: a cognitive concept,
its linguistic expression and cul-
tural context,” in Proceedings of
the 25th Annual Conference of the
Cognitive Science Society, eds R.
Alterman and D. Kirsh (Mahwah,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates),
133–138.
Bender, A., and Beller, S. (2011a). Cul-
tural variation in numeration sys-
tems and their mapping onto the
mental number line. J. Cross Cult.
Psychol. 42, 579–597.
Bender, A., and Beller, S. (2011b).
The cultural constitution of cogni-
tion: taking the anthropological per-
spective. Front. Psychol. 2:67. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00067
Bender, A., Beller, S., and Ben-
nardo, G. (2010a). Temporal frames
of reference: conceptual analysis
and empirical evidence from Ger-
man, English, Mandarin Chinese,
and Tongan. J. Cogn. Cult. 10,
283–307.
Bender, A., Hutchins, E., and Medin,
D. L. (2010b). Anthropology in cog-
nitive science. Top. Cogn. Sci. 2,
374–385.
Bender,A., Spada,H., Seitz, S., Swoboda,
H., and Traber, S. (2007). Anger and
rank in Tonga and Germany: cogni-
tion, emotion, and context. Ethos 35,
196–234.
Boroditsky, L., and Gaby, A. (2010).
Absolute spatial representations
of time in an Aboriginal Aus-
tralian community. Psychol. Sci. 21,
1635–1639.
Cheng, P. W. (1997). From covari-
ation to causation: a causal
power theory. Psychol. Rev. 104,
367–405.
Chung, S. (1978). Case Marking and
Grammatical Relations in Polynesian.
Austin,TX:University of Texas Press.
Cummins, D. D. (1995). Naive theories
and causal deduction. Mem. Cognit.
23, 646–658.
Duranti, A. (1994). From Grammar to
Politics: Linguistic Anthropology in
a Western Samoan Village. Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press.
Evans, M. (2001). Persistence of the Gift.
Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University
Press.
Fausey, C., and Boroditsky, L. (2011).
Who dunnit? Cross-linguistic differ-
ences in eye-witness memory. Psy-
chon. Bull. Rev. 18, 150–157.
Gopnik,A., and Schulz, L. (eds). (2007).
Causal Learning. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Henrich, J.,Heine,S. J., andNorenzayan,
A. (2010). The weirdest people in the
world? Behav. Brain Sci. 33, 1–75.
Hubbard, T. L., and Favretto, A. (2003).
Naïve impetus and Michotte’s “tool
effect”: evidence from representa-
tional momentum. Psychol. Res. 67,
134–152.
Kempton, W. M. (1986). Two theories
of home heat control. Cogn. Sci. 10,
75–90.
Klauer, K. C., Beller, S., and Hütter,
M. (2010). Conditional reasoning
in context: a dual-source model of
probabilistic inference. J. Exp. Psy-
chol. Learn.Mem.Cogn. 36,298–323.
Kuhnmünch, G., and Beller, S. (2005).
Distinguishing between causes and
enabling conditions – through men-
tal models or linguistic cues? Cogn.
Sci. 29, 1077–1090.
Legare, C. H., Evans, E. M., Rosengren,
K., and Harris, P. (in press). The
coexistence of natural and supernat-
ural explanations across cultures and
development. Child Dev.
Legare, C. H., and Gelman, S. A.
(2008). Bewitchment, biology, or
both: the co-existence of natural and
supernatural explanatory frame-
works across development. Cogn.
Sci. 32, 607–642.
Majid,A.,Bowerman,M.,Kita, S.,Haun,
D. B. M., and Levinson, S. C. (2004).
Can language restructure cognition?
The case for space. Trends Cogn. Sci.
(Regul. Ed.) 8, 108–114.
Majid, A., Sanford, A. J., and Pickering,
M. J. (2007). The linguistic descrip-
tion of minimal social scenarios
affects the extent of causal infer-
ence making. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 43,
918–932.
Malle, B. (1999). How people explain
behavior: a new theoretical frame-
work. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Rev. 3,
23–48.
Marcus, G. E. (1978). Status rivalry
in a Polynesian steady-state society.
Ethos 6, 242–269.
Markus, H. R., and Kitayama, S. (1991).
Culture and the self: implications for
cognition, emotion, and motivation.
Psychol. Rev. 98, 224–253.
McCloskey,M. (1983). Intuitive physics.
Sci. Am. 248, 122–130.
Michotte, A. (1963). The Perception of
Causality. New York: Basic Books.
Morris, M. W., and Peng, K. (1994).
Culture and cause: American and
Chinese attributions for social and
physical events. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.
67, 949–971.
Morton, H. (1996). Becoming Tongan:
An Ethnography of Childhood. Hon-
olulu, HI: University of Hawai’i
Press.
Norenzayan, A., and Heine, S. J. (2005).
Psychological universals: what are
they and how can we know? Psychol.
Bull. 131, 763–784.
Norenzayan, A., and Nisbett, R. E.
(2000). Culture and causal cog-
nition. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Res. 9,
132–135.
Peng, K., Ames, D. R., and Knowles,
E. D. (2001). “Culture and human
inference: perspectives from
three traditions,” in Hand-
book of Culture and Psychology,
ed. D. R. Matsumoto (New
York: Oxford University Press),
245–264.
Peng, K., and Knowles, E. D. (2003).
Culture, education, and the attribu-
tion of physical causality. Pers. Soc.
Psychol. Bull. 29, 1272–1284.
Spelke, E. S., and Kinzler, K. D.
(2007). Core knowledge.Dev. Sci. 10,
89–96.
Sperber, D., Premack, D., and Premack,
A. J. (eds). (1995). Causal Cognition.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Talmy, L. (1988). Force dynamics in lan-
guage and cognition. Cogn. Sci. 12,
49–100.
Waldmann, M. R., Hagmayer, Y., and
Blaisdell, A. P. (2006). Beyond the
information given: causal models in
learning and reasoning. Curr. Dir.
Psychol. Res. 15, 307–311.
White, P.A. (2006). The causal asymme-
try. Psychol. Rev. 113, 132–147.
White, P. A. (2007). Impressions of
force in visual perception of collision
events: a test of the causal asymme-
try hypothesis.Psychon. Bull. Rev. 14,
647–652.
Wolff, P. (2007). Representing cau-
sation. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 136,
82–111.
Wolff, P., Klettke, B., Ventura, T., and
Song, G. (2005). “Expressing causa-
tion in English and other languages,”
in Categorization Inside and Outside
of the Laboratory, eds W. Ahn, R. L.
Goldstone, B. C. Love, A. B. Mark-
man, and P. Wolff (Washington,DC:
APA), 29–48.
Conﬂict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any com-
mercial or ﬁnancial relationships that
could be construed as a potential con-
ﬂict of interest.
Received: 22 July 2011; accepted: 29
August 2011; published online: 22 Sep-
tember 2011.
Citation: Bender A and Beller S
(2011)Causal asymmetry across cultures:
assigning causal roles in symmetric phys-
ical settings. Front. Psychology 2:231. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00231
This article was submitted to Frontiers
in Cultural Psychology, a specialty of
Frontiers in Psychology.
Copyright © 2011 Bender and Beller .
This is an open-access article subject
to a non-exclusive license between the
authors and Frontiers Media SA, which
permits use, distribution and reproduc-
tion in other forums, provided the original
authors and source are credited and other
Frontiers conditions are complied with.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cultural Psychology September 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 231 | 10
